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Abstract
This is intended to be a serious paper, in spite of the title. The idea is that
quantum mechanics is about probabilistic correlations, i.e., about the structure of
information, since a theory of information is essentially a theory of probabilis-
tic correlations. To make this clear, it suffices to consider measurements of two
binary-valued observables, x with outcomes a = 0 or 1, performed by Alice in a
regionA, and y with outcomes b = 0 or 1 performed by Bob in a separated region
B—or, to emphasize the banality of the phenomena, two ways of peeling a banana,
resulting in one of two tastes. The imagined bananas of Bananaworld are non-
standard, with operational or phenomenal probabilistic correlations for peelings
and tastes that lie outside the polytope of local correlations. The ‘no go’ theorems
tell us that we can’t shoe-horn these correlations into a classical correlation poly-
tope, which has the structure of a simplex, by supposing that something has been
left out of the story, without giving up fundamental principles that define what we
mean by a physical system. The nonclassical features of quantum mechanics, in-
cluding the irreducible information loss on measurement, are shown to be generic
features of correlations that lie outside the local correlation polytope. As far as the
conceptual problems are concerned, we might as well talk about bananas.
This paper is intended to be serious, in spite of the title. The idea is that quantum
mechanics is about probabilistic correlations, i.e., about the structure of information,
since a theory of information is essentially a theory of probabilistic correlations—not
about energy being quantized in discrete lumps or quanta, not about particles being
wavelike, not about the universe continually splitting into countless co-existing quasi-
classical universes, with many copies of ourselves, or anything like that. To make this
clear, it suffices to consider measurements of two binary-valued observables, x with
outcomes a = 0 or 1, performed by Alice in a regionA, and y with outcomes b = 0 or
1 performed by Bob in a separate region B. In fact, it suffices to consider bananas.
In the first section (‘Bananaworld’), I show that a variety of ‘no go’ theorems about
the impossibility of extending quantum mechanics—by Bell [2], Kochen-Specker [18],
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Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph [22], Colbeck-Renner [10]—can be applied to operational or
phenomenal correlation phenomena involving bananas on an imaginary island called
Bananaworld. The point is to make clear that conceptual puzzles associated with the
completeness problem—the ‘hidden variable’ problem, broadly construed—are fea-
tures of rather banal correlation phenomena that have nothing in particular to do with
Hilbert space or the specific behavior of microsystems evolving according to the wave
dynamics of the Schro¨dinger equation.
The second section (‘Taking Stock’) develops the notion of probabilistic correla-
tions in terms of correlation arrays. Operational correlations represented by points in-
side the polytope of local correlations can be simulated with classical resources, which
generate classical correlations represented by the points in a simplex, where the ver-
tices of the simplex represent joint deterministic states that are the common causes of
the correlations. The conceptual problems in Bananaworld, as in our quantum world,
arise because probabilistic correlations can lie outside the local correlation polytope.
In Bananaworld, as in other non-classical (= non-simplex) worlds, cloning an arbitrary
extremal state is impossible without violating the no-signaling principle, and there is a
necessary information loss associated with measurement.
In the third section (‘The Measurement Problem’), I consider the measurement
problem in Bananaworld. There are two distinct aspects to the measurement problem.
In a simplex theory, it is possible to explain dynamically how a particular measurement
outcome is selected in a measurement process. In a non-simplex theory, any such dy-
namical account would be inconsistent with the no-signaling principle. The selection
of a particular outcome in a quantum measurement, and the associated loss of com-
plementary information, is a genuinely random event, a ‘free choice’ on the part of
the system, not the culmination of a dynamical process. So there is nothing further to
be said about this aspect of measurement in a non-simplex theory. The second aspect
is the problem of how to account for the definiteness of the part of the universe that
records the outcomes of quantum measurements or random Bananaworld events. We
can’t simply assume that quantum phenomena or Bananaworld phenomena take place
in a classical arena that provides the physical infrastructure for definite stable records.
I argue that this is a consistency problem, and I propose a possible solution.
1 Bananaworld
Imagine discovering an island with banana trees—Bananaworld. The bananas in Ba-
nanaworld are peculiar in that half the peel is the familiar yellow, and the other half
brown, with a seam connecting the two halves. There are two ways to peel one of these
bananas: one can either peel the yellow half (Y ) along the seam, or the brown half
(B). A Bananaworld banana tastes just like an ordinary banana (0), or the flavor is
intense, incredible, indescribably delicious (1), seemingly dependent on how you peel
the banana.
So there are two things you can do to a banana in Bananaworld (corresponding to
a binary choice of measurements), and two possible outcomes (corresponding to two
possible measurement outcomes).
It turns out that there are various sorts or states of bananas. Some trees have a
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large bunch of bananas that one might call ‘pure state’ bananas. There are four types
of pure state bananas: Y 0, Y 1, B0, B1. For all the bananas on a Y 0 bunch, if you peel
the yellow half, the banana tastes ordinary, but if you peel the brown half, the banana
tastes ordinary or intense with probability 1/2. Similarly, for all the bananas on a Y 1
bunch, if you peel Y , the banana tastes intense , but if you peel B, the banana tastes
ordinary or intense with probability 1/2. And similarly for B0 and B1 bananas.
There are also trees that have one bunch with just two bananas. If you peel Y
or B for either of these bananas, the banana tastes ordinary (0) or intense (1) with
equal probability. But peelings and tastes for such a banana pair are correlated like the
correlations of a Popescu-Rohrlich box (PR-box) [20], and the correlations persist if the
bananas are separated and then peeled when they are apart, even at opposite ends of the
island: if you peel Y Y, Y B orBY , both bananas taste the same, with equal probability
for 00 or 11, but if you peel BB, the bananas taste different, with equal probability for
01 or 10. I’ll call these (E)PR pairs, because they are the analogue, in Bananaworld,
of entangled Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) spin states or Bell states1 (the sort of
quantum state considered by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen [13] in their argument for
the incompleteness of quantum theory), but they exhibit the superquantum correlations
of a PR-box.
These correlations are impossible if each banana in an (E)PR pair has a definite
taste before it is peeled, assuming the taste of a banana is independent of how the
paired banana is peeled (each of the four possible taste combinations 00, 01, 10, 11 is
inconsistent with a possible pair of peelings). Moreover, it follows from Bell’s locality
argument [2] that these correlations have no common cause explanation.
A common cause (or local hidden variable representing ‘shared randomness’) is
a variable λ such that, given λ, the correlations vanish. That is, the joint probability
of a pair of tastes for a pair of peelings is conditionally statistically independent with
respect to λ:
p(t1, t2|q1, q2, λ) = p(t1|q1, λ)p(t2|q2, λ) (1)
where q1 and q2 denote the type of peeling, Y or B, for the two bananas, and t1 and t2
denote the respective tastes, ordinary (0) or intense (1), for the two bananas.
Conditional statistical independence is equivalent to the conjunction of two condi-
tions:2
• parameter independence (Bell locality, or no signaling given λ): the probability
that an (E)PR banana tastes ordinary or intense, given λ and a particular peeling
(Y or B) is independent of how you peel the paired banana
• outcome independence: the probability that an (E)PR banana tastes ordinary or
intense, given λ and a particular peeling (Y or B), is independent of the taste of
the paired banana after it is peeled
1The Bell states are the four mutually orthogonal entangled pure states 1√
2
(|0〉|1〉−|1〉|0〉), 1√
2
(|0〉|1〉+
|1〉|0〉), 1√
2
(|0〉|0〉+ |1〉|1〉), 1√
2
(|0〉|0〉− |1〉|1〉), related to each other by local reversible operations. See
[?, p. 25].
2The terminology is due to Abner Shimony [23]. For a proof of the equivalence here, see [7, pp. 66–67].
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To see that the (E)PR correlations have no common cause explanation, it is conve-
nient to re-label ‘ordinary’ as -1 and ‘intense’ as +1. Then, indicating the dependence
on the common cause λ by a subscript:
〈q1q2〉λ = pλ(−1,−1|q1, q2)− pλ(−1, 1|q1, q2)− pλ(1,−1|q1, q2)
+pλ(1, 1|q1, q2) (2)
= pλ(−1|q1)pλ(−1|q2)− pλ(−1|q1)pλ(1|q2)− pλ(1|q1)pλ(−1|q2)
+pλ(1|q1)pλ(1|q2) (3)
= (pλ(1|q1)− pλ(−1|q1))(pλ(1|q2)− pλ(−1|q2))
= 〈q1〉λ〈q2〉λ (4)
where the step from (2) to (3) follows from conditional statistical independence (1).3
So
Kλ = 〈Y1Y2〉λ + 〈Y1B2〉λ + 〈B1Y2〉λ − 〈B1B2〉λ
= 〈Y1〉λ〈Y2〉λ + 〈Y1〉λ〈B2〉λ + 〈B1〉λ〈Y2〉λ − 〈B1〉λ〈B2〉λ
= 〈Y1〉λ(〈Y2〉λ + 〈B2〉λ) + 〈B1〉λ(〈Y2〉λ − 〈B2〉λ) (5)
Since the expectation values 〈Y1〉λ, 〈Y2〉λ, 〈B1〉λ, 〈B2〉λ take the values ±1, the
maximum and minimum values for either term in parenthesis is +2 or −2, in which
case the other term in parenthesis is 0, so:
− 2 ≤ Kλ ≤ 2 (6)
It follow that K = 〈Y Y 〉 + 〈Y B〉 + 〈BY 〉 − 〈BB〉 = ∫ Kλρ(λ)dλ, the Clauser-
Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) correlation (where ρ(λ) is the distribution of common
causes or local hidden variables), is similarly bounded:
− 2 ≤ K ≤ 2 (7)
But, since
〈q1q2〉 = p(taste same|q1, q2)− p(taste different|q1, q2) (8)
the CHSH correlation for (E)PR banana pairs is:
K = 〈Y Y 〉+ 〈Y B〉+ 〈BY 〉 − 〈BB〉
= p(taste same|Y, Y ) + p(taste same|Y,B)
+p(taste same|B, Y ) + p(taste different|B,B)
= 4 (9)
which excludes a common cause or ‘shared randomness’ explanation of (E)PR corre-
lations. The maximum value of K for a pair of entangled quantum states is 2
√
2, the
3The quantity 〈q1q2〉, the expectation value of the product of two peelings, like the expectation value of
the product of two observables, is the weighted sum of the product of the tastes (represented numerically as
-1, +1), where the weights are the joint probabilities of the pair of tastes. The product of the tastes is either
1 or -1, depending on whether the tastes are the same or different.
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Tsirelson bound, which is between 2 and 4, so entangled quantum states are rather like
(E)PR banana pairs.
A recent result by Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph (PBR) [22] shows that quantum
pure states cannot be interpreted epistemically as states of knowledge represented by
probability distributions over unknown ‘ontic’ states. If quantum pure states could be
interpreted epistemically, then any given ontic state λ would be compatible with two
or more different quantum pure states, in the sense that the distributions corresponding
to the quantum states would overlap in a subset of the ontic state space containing λ.
In the simple version of the argument, PBR consider preparing a quantum system (a
qubit) in one of two quantum states: |0〉 or |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), where |〈0|+〉| = 1√
2
.
Say |0〉 and |1〉 are eigenstates of z-spin, and |+〉 and |−〉 are eigenstates of x-spin.
The supposition of the ‘no go’ theorem is that the epistemic states |0〉 and |+〉 overlap
in the ontic state space. There is therefore a certain finite probability p that preparing
the system in either of these states will result in an ontic state λ in the overlap region.
If, now, two independent non-interacting systems are prepared in either of the quantum
states |0〉 or |+〉, with probability p2 the systems will be in ontic states λ1, λ2, both
in the overlap region. It follows that the ontic state λ of the composite 2-qubit system
(which the argument assumes is specified by the pair of local ontic states λ = (λ1, λ2),
because the systems are independent and non-interacting) is compatible with the four
quantum states: |0〉 ⊗ |0〉, |0〉 ⊗ |+〉, |+〉 ⊗ |0〉, |+〉 ⊗ |+〉.
Now PBR consider measuring an observable A on the composite system with en-
tangled eigenstates:
1√
2
(|0〉 ⊗ |1〉+ |1〉 ⊗ |0〉) (10)
1√
2
(|0〉 ⊗ |−〉+ |1〉 ⊗ |+〉) (11)
1√
2
(|+〉 ⊗ |1〉+ |−〉 ⊗ |0〉) (12)
1√
2
(|+〉 ⊗ |−〉+ |−〉 ⊗ |+〉) (13)
The outcome of the measurement should depend only on the ontic state: given the
ontic state, an epistemic state provides no further information relevant to the occurrence
of an event. But, according to quantum mechanics, the outcome corresponding to
1√
2
(|0〉⊗ |1〉+ |1〉⊗ |0〉) is impossible (i.e., has zero probability) if the initial quantum
state is |0〉 ⊗ |0〉, since |0〉 ⊗ |0〉 is orthogonal to 1√
2
(|0〉 ⊗ |1〉+ |1〉 ⊗ |0〉. Similarly:
• |0〉 ⊗ |+〉 is orthogonal to 1√
2
(|0〉 ⊗ |−〉+ |1〉 ⊗ |+〉)
• |+〉 ⊗ |0〉 is orthogonal to 1√
2
(|+〉 ⊗ |1〉+ |−〉 ⊗ |0〉)
• |+〉 ⊗ |+〉 is orthogonal to 1√
2
(|+〉 ⊗ |−〉+ |−〉 ⊗ |+〉)
so none of the outcomes can occur. This is a contradiction. The sum of the probabilities
of the four possible outcomes is 1, so one of the outcomes must occur.
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The conclusion PBR draw is that the quantum state must be real: ‘distinct quan-
tum states must correspond to physically distinct states of reality’ [21, abstract], so a
quantum state must be (at least part of) an ontic state [22, p. 476]:
We have shown that the distributions for |0〉 and |+〉 cannot overlap. If the
same can be shown for any pair of quantum states |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉, then the
quantum state can be inferred uniquely from λ. In this case, the quantum
state is a physical property of the system.
PBR proceed to prove this, from which it would seem that the only possible inter-
pretative possibilities that take quantum mechanics as strictly true are Bohm’s theory
(in which the full ontic state is the quantum state together with the ‘hidden variable,’
the position in configuration space of all the particles) or the Everett interpretation (in
which the ontic state is just the quantum state). The general argument involves consid-
ering n copies of the system, where n depends on the angle between the states |ψ0〉 and
|ψ1〉 (the smaller the angle between the states, the larger the number n of copies that
needs to be considered). The argument does not require the assumption of conditional
statistical independence with respect to the ontic state for the quantum probabilities
of joint events, so the result is different from Bell’s theorem. What replaces condi-
tional statistical independence is the (arguably innocuous) assumption that each of the
copies can be prepared in a given pure quantum state independently of the others, and
that this also applies to ontic states, so that there are no supercorrelations at the ontic
level and the ontic state of the composite many-copy system is specified by the set of
independent ontic states of the copies.
The PBR argument can be formulated in Bananaworld. First note that the four
eigenstates of the observableA that PBR measure in the simple version of the argument
represent anticorrelation with respect to z-spin and z-spin, z-spin and x-spin, x-spin
and z-spin, and x-spin and x-spin, respectively. With a bit of cheating (since no dy-
namics has been specified here for Bananaworld), we will assume that the counterpart
of the dynamical interaction associated with the A-measurement involves putting the
stems of two pure state bananas, each in one of the states Y 0 orB0, into a good quality
espresso with small amount of foamed milk. We find that they grow together—evolve
dynamically—into a pair that is anticorrelated for one of the four possible peelings
Y Y, Y B,BY,BB, except that:
• if the pair is initially Y 0Y 0, then they never end up anticorrelated for Y Y
• if the pair is initially Y 0B0, then they never end up anticorrelated for Y B
• if the pair is initially B0Y 0, then they never end up anticorrelated for BY
• if the pair is initially B0B0, then they never end up anticorrelated for BB
This corresponds to the facts in the quantum case, e.g., the orthogonality of |0〉 ⊗ |0〉
and 1√
2
(|0〉 ⊗ |1〉 + |1〉 ⊗ |0〉), so that if the initial state is |0〉 ⊗ |0〉 then the outcome
corresponding to 1√
2
(|0〉⊗ |1〉+ |1〉⊗ |0〉)—anticorrelation with respect to the z-spins
of the two particles—never occurs.
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In a banana pure state like Y 0, if you peel B, the banana tastes ordinary or intense
with probability 1/2. So suppose Y 0 is interpreted as an epistemic state, representing
ignorance about some ontic state λ. Then what happens if you put the stems of two
pure state bananas into a macchiato depends on their ontic states, λ1, λ2.
Suppose two epistemic states like Y 0, B0 are compatible with the same ontic
state. Then two bananas in the ontic states λ1, λ2, each compatible with the epis-
temic states Y 0, B0, would be compatible with the four pairs of epistemic states:
Y 0Y 0, Y 0B0, B0Y 0, B0B0.
But if that were the case, then contrary to what we find in Bananaworld, the two
bananas could never become a pair that is anticorrelated for one of the four possible
peelings Y Y, Y B,BY , or BB, because the initial state Y 0Y 0 excludes eventual an-
ticorrelation for Y Y , the initial state Y 0B0 excludes eventual anticorrelation for Y B,
the initial state B0Y 0 excludes eventual anticorrelation for BY , and the initial state
B0B0 excludes eventual anticorrelation for BB.
A similar result by Colbeck and Renner [10], from a very different argument, shows
that no extension of quantum mechanics can improve predictability unless ‘free choice’
is violated for measurements on a bipartite system in a pure entangled state: Alice’s
(or Bob’s) choice of a measurement setting could not be independent of information
that is in principle available before the choice, i.e., the choice would be correlated
with the ontic state prior to the choice in some frame of reference. So, assuming ‘free
choice,’ it follows that quantum states are the whole story, i.e., quantum states are in
1-1 correspondence with ontic states.
If ‘free choice’ is violated for Alice, then Bob would have instantaneous informa-
tion about Alice’s choice of measurement setting if he has access to the ontic state
immediately after Alice’s measurement, so instantaneous signaling would be possible
(unless access to the ontic state is blocked for some reason, as in Bohm’s theory). The
‘no signaling’ principle for quantum mechanics is the requirement that Alice’s marginal
probabilities, given the quantum state, are independent of Bob’s measurement setting
choices or, more generally, independent of anything Bob does, and conversely. Note
that the no-signaling principle does not refer to any hidden variables or ontic states,
and it does not involve the velocity of light, c. Of course if the no-signaling princi-
ple is violated, then the relativistic constraint is violated and superluminal signaling is
possible. But no signaling is a more fundamental principle than the relativistic con-
straint limiting the physical transfer of information to subluminal velocities—in effect,
the satisfaction of the no-signaling principle for two systems is part of what it means
to have two separate systems. Parameter independence is ‘no-signaling conditional
on the ontic state’—or, equivalently, no-signaling is parameter independence averaged
over the ontic states. So a violation of ‘free choice’ entails a violation of parameter
independence, and conversely.
In effect, the Colbeck-Renner result is a proof of Bell’s theorem from parameter in-
dependence without requiring outcome independence, i.e., from a weaker assumption
than Bell’s assumption of conditional statistical independence. Parameter indepen-
dence is well-motivated because, assuming access to the ontic state, if this assumption
were violated, then instantaneous signaling would be possible. Outcome independence
does not have the same plausibility. Alice and Bob cannot exploit a violation of out-
come independence to signal instantaneously, even given access to the ontic state, be-
7
cause measurement outcomes are random and not under their control: they can choose
the measurement settings, but not the measurement outcomes. So it is an interesting
question to consider whether one can prove a ‘no go’ theorem from parameter indepen-
dence without assuming outcome independence: is an extension of quantum mechanics
with improved predictive power possible, where the extended theory satisfies parameter
independence but not necessarily outcome independence? Colbeck and Renner prove
a result that answers the question negatively.
The Colbeck-Renner result has an analogue in Bananaworld. First note that the
no-signaling principle is satisfied for (E)PR pairs: Alice’s banana tastes ordinary or in-
tense with equal probability, irrespective of how Bob peels his banana, and conversely.
Suppose that Bob could somehow extract sufficient information from a measurement
of some parameter λ to know the taste of his banana for both possible peelings, Y or
B (we can think of λ as the ontic state of the (E)PR pair, or part of the ontic state).
Suppose Bob’s information is that the tastes for his two possible peelings are j and
k, where j, k ∈ {0, 1}. Consider a reference frame in which Bob’s measurement of
λ occurs immediately after Alice peels her banana. If j = k, then Bob can infer that
Alice peeled Y , because otherwise, if Alice peeled B, Alice’s banana would have to
taste the same as Bob’s banana if he peeled Y , but different from Bob’s banana if he
peeled B, which is impossible if Bob’s banana is in some ontic state that tastes the
same for both possible peelings. Similarly, if j 6= k, then Bob can infer that Alice
peeled B, because otherwise, if Alice peeled Y , Bob’s banana for either of his two
possible peelings would have to taste the same as Alice’s banana, which would require
Bob’s banana to taste the same for either peeling. So Bob can infer whether Alice
peeled Y or B from his measurement of λ and the no-signaling principle is violated:
Alice can signal instantaneously to Bob. Alternatively, in a reference frame in which
Bob’s measurement of λ occurs before Alice peels her banana, Alice’s measurement
setting depends on information that is available to Bob before her choice, so Alice’s
choice is not free. The same conclusion follows if the information Bob extracts from
his measurement of λ is partial: it suffices for him to discover whether the tastes for
the two possible peelings of his banana are the same or different.
So there is a measurement problem in Bananaworld. If we reject the possibility
of instantaneous signaling, or we assume that the choice of how to peel a banana is
unconstrained or free, in the sense that this choice is independent of any information
that is in principle available before the choice, then there must be a necessary informa-
tion loss about whether an (E)PR banana peeled Y would taste ordinary or intense in
the course of a measurement that provides information about the taste if the banana is
peeled B, and conversely. It follows that there can be no more refined story about the
probabilistic correlations of an (E)PR pair that yields information about the tastes of
Alice’s or Bob’s banana for both possible peelings, or even information about whether
the tastes are the same or different, unless ‘free choice’ is violated or, equivalently,
unless parameter independence (no signaling given the more refined story) is violated.
For similar reasons, it is impossible to clone a banana belonging to an (E)PR pair.
Suppose Alice and Bob share an (E)PR pair of bananas, and Bob could clone his ba-
nana. If Bob peels Y for his banana and B for the clone, then he could infer whether
Alice peeled Y or B from the tastes of his bananas: same taste indicates that Alice
peeled Y ; different taste indicates that Alice peeled B. So Alice could signal instanta-
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neously to Bob if Bob peels his bananas immediately after Alice peels her banana (or
superluminally if there is a suitably small time lag). If Alice peels her banana after Bob
peeled his bananas, then Alice’s choice of peeling depends on whether Bob’s banana
and the clone taste the same or different. So if we assume that there is no constraint
on the choice of how to peel a banana, or that there is no violation of the no-signaling
principle, then cloning an (E)PR banana is impossible.
The previous ‘no go’ results—Bell, PBR, Colbeck-Renner—all involve correla-
tions between spatially separate systems. But there are also correlations between the
outcomes of compatible measurements on a single system. Kochen and Specker [18]
identified a finite set of 1-dimensional projection operators on a 3-dimensional Hilbert
space, in which an individual projection operator can belong to different orthogonal
triples of projection operators representing different bases or measurement contexts,
such that there is no noncontextual assignment of 0 and 1 values to the projection oper-
ators (where each projection operator is assigned one and only one value independent
of context) that also respects the correlations defined by the orthogonality relations:
two orthogonal projection operators cannot both be assigned the value 1. It follows
from the Kochen-Specker theorem that the distributions of measurement outcomes for
quantum states in a Hilbert space of three or more dimensions cannot be simulated by
noncontextual assignments of values to all observables, or even to certain finite sets of
observables.
The Kochen-Specker proof is a state-independent proof. The simplest proof of
the Kochen-Specker theorem is Klyachko’s state-dependent proof [15, 16]. Klyachko
derived an inequality for probability assignments to the eigenvalues of five observables,
which is satisfied by any noncontextual assignment of values to this set of observables,
but is violated by the probabilities defined by a certain quantum state. The argument is
so pretty that it is worth repeating here.4
Consider a unit sphere and imagine a circle Σ1 on the equator of the sphere with an
inscribed pentagon and pentagram, with the vertices of the pentagram labelled in order
1, 2, 3, 4, 5 (see Figure 1). Note that the angle subtended at the center O by adjacent
vertices of the pentagram defining an edge (e.g., 1 and 2) is θ = 4pi/5, which is greater
than pi/2. It follows that if the radii linking O to the vertices are pulled upwards towards
the north pole of the sphere, the circle with the inscribed pentagon and pentagram will
move up on the sphere towards the north pole. Since θ = 0 when the radii point to the
north pole (and the circle vanishes), θ must pass through pi/2 before the radii point to
the north pole, which means that it is possible to draw a circle Σ2 with an inscribed
pentagon and pentagram on the sphere at some point between the equator and the north
pole, such that the angle subtended at O by an edge of the pentagram is pi/2. Label the
centre of this circle P (see Figure 2; note that the line OP is orthogonal to the circle Σ2
and is not in the plane of the pentagram).
We can therefore define five orthogonal triples of vectors, i.e., five bases in a 3-
4This formulation of Klyachko’s result, reproduced from [9], owes much to a discussion with Ben Toner
and differs from the analysis in [15, 16].
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Figure 1: Circle Σ1
dimensional Hilbert spaceH3, representing five different measurement contexts:
|1〉, |2〉, |v〉
|2〉, |3〉, |w〉
|3〉, |4〉, |x〉
|4〉, |5〉, |y〉
|5〉, |1〉, |z〉
Here |v〉 is orthogonal to |1〉 and |2〉, etc. Note that each vector |1〉, |2〉, |3〉, |4〉, |5〉
belongs to two different contexts. The vectors |u〉, |v〉, |x〉, |y〉, |z〉 play no role in the
following analysis, and we can take a context as defined by an edge of the pentagram
in the circle Σ2.
Consider, now, assigning 0’s and 1’s to all the vertices of the pentagram in Σ2 non-
contextually (i.e., each vertex is assigned a value independently of the edge to which it
belongs), in such a way as to satisfy the orthogonality constraint that at most one 1 can
be assigned to the two vertices of an edge. The orthogonality constraint can be satisfied
noncontextually by assignments of zero 1’s, one 1, or two 1’s (but not by three 1’s, four
1’s, or five 1’s). It follows that for any such noncontextual assignment, where v(i) is
the value assigned to the vertex i:
5∑
i=1
v(i) ≤ 2 (14)
and so:
5∑
i=1
p(v(i) = 1) ≤ 2 (15)
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Figure 2: Circle Σ2
for any distribution of noncontextual value assignments.
Now consider a quantum system in the state defined by a unit vector that passes
through the north pole of the sphere. This vector passes through the point P in the
center of the circle Σ2. Call this state |ψ〉. A simple geometric argument shows that if
probabilities are assigned to the 1-dimensional projectors defined by the vertices of the
pentagram on Σ2 by the state |ψ〉, then the sum of the probabilities is greater than 2.
To see this, note that the probability assigned to a vertex, say the vertex 1, is:
|〈1|ψ〉|2 = cos2 φ (16)
where |1〉 is the unit vector defined by the radius from O to the vertex 1. (Of course,
each vertex is assigned the same probability by |ψ〉, which is symmetrically placed
with respect to the five vertices, i.e., the angle φ is the same for each vertex.) Since the
lines from the center O of the sphere to the vertices of an edge of the pentagram on Σ2
are radii of length 1 subtending a right angle, each edge of the pentagram has length√
2. The angle subtended at P by the lines joining P to the two vertices of an edge is
4pi/5, so the length, s, of the line joining P to a vertex of the pentagram is:
s =
1√
2 cos pi10
(17)
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Now, cosφ = r, where r is the length of the line OP , and r2 + s2 = 1, so:
cos2 φ = r2 = 1− s2 = cos
pi
5
1 + cos pi5
=
1√
5
(18)
(because cospi/5 = 14 (1 +
√
5)), and hence:
5∑
i=1
p(v(i) = 1) =
√
5 > 2 (19)
There is an analogue of the Klyachko argument in Bananaworld. In addition to
bananas with half the skin yellow and the other half brown, some banana trees have
bunches of five bananas with perfectly ordinary yellow skins. The five bananas splay
out from a central stem like the radii of a pentagram. If two adjacent bananas in these
Klyachko bunches are peeled while still on the stem, one banana always tastes ordinary
(0) and the other banana intense (1).5 If the bananas are separated, peelings and tastes
are uncorrelated. Once two adjacent bananas are peeled, the remaining three bananas
turn out to be inedible. The bananas also turn out to be inedible if two non-adjacent
bananas are peeled, or if more than two bananas are peeled.
Labeling the bananas in order around the vertices of the pentagon (not the penta-
gram) as a, b, c, d, e, it follows that:
p(a tastes 1) + p(b tastes 1) = 1
p(b tastes 1) + p(c tastes 1) = 1
p(c tastes 1) + p(d tastes 1) = 1
p(d tastes 1) + p(e tastes 1) = 1
p(e tastes 1) + p(a tastes 1) = 1 (20)
So:
2(p(a tastes 1) + p(b tastes 1) + p(c tastes 1) + p(d tastes 1) + p(e tastes 1)) = 5
i.e.,
e∑
i=a
p(i tastes 1) =
5
2
> 2 (21)
in Bananaworld, which is the maximal violation of the Klyachko inequality consistent
with the orthogonality constraint, just as the value 4 in Bananaworld is the maximal
value of the CHSH inequality consistent with the no-signaling constraint. Labeling the
sum of the five probabilities as K, we have:
Kclassical(= 2) < Kquantum(=
√
5 ≈ 2.236) < KBananaworld(= 2.5) (22)
5We could have formulated the constraint for bananas connected by an edge of the pentagram, but it is
simpler to consider the constraint for adjacent bananas, i.e., bananas connected by an edge of the pentagon.
In effect, pentagon edges correspond to orthogonality relations for Klyachko bananas.
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2 Taking Stock
There is nothing intrinsically impossible about the phenomena in Bananaworld. A little
weird, perhaps, but easy to imagine. What would we make of this? A banana split in-
terpretation, that each time one peels a banana, the banana and the entire Bananaworld
with it, splits into multiple copies with differently peeled and different-tasting bananas,
is not the first thing that leaps to mind.
Consider an (E)PR pair of bananas. The correlations can be represented in a cor-
relation array as in Table 1. The probability p(00|Y Y ) is to be read as p(0, 0|Y, Y ),
i.e., as a joint conditional probability for both bananas tasting ordinary (0) when Alice
and Bob both peel Y, and the probability p(01|BY ) is to be read as p(0, 1|B, Y ), etc. I
drop the commas for ease of reading in this section; the first two slots in p(−− | −−)
before the conditionalization sign | represent the two possible tastes for Alice’s and
Bob’s bananas, respectively, and the second two slots after the conditionalization sign
represent the two possible peelings that Alice and Bob choose, respectively. Note that
sequences like 01 or BY in this section represent pairs, not products. The marginal
probability of 0 for Alice or for Bob is obtained by adding the probabilities in the left
column of each cell or the top row of each cell, respectively, and the marginal proba-
bility of 1 for Alice or for Bob by adding the probabilities in the right column of each
cell or the bottom row of each cell, respectively. The tastes are uncorrelated if the joint
probability is expressible as a product of marginal or local probabilities for Alice and
Bob; otherwise they are correlated.
Alice Y B
Bob
Y p(00|Y Y ) = 12 p(10|Y Y ) = 0 p(00|BY ) = 12 p(10|BY ) = 0
p(01|Y Y ) = 0 p(11|Y Y ) = 12 p(01|BY ) = 0 p(11|BY ) = 12
B p(00|Y B) = 12 p(10|Y B) = 0 p(00|BB) = 0 p(10|BB) = 12
p(01|Y B) = 0 p(11|Y B) = 12 p(01|BB) = 12 p(11|BB) = 0
Table 1: (E)PR correlation array
Now consider all possible correlation arrays of the above form. They represent
the pure and mixed states of a bipartite system with two binary-valued observables
for each subsystem and form a regular convex polytope with 256 vertices, where the
vertices represent the extremal deterministic arrays or pure states with probabilities 0 or
1 only.6 The polytope is the closed convex hull of the vertices, i.e., the smallest closed
convex set containing the vertices. There are four possible arrangements of 0’s and 1’s
that add to 1 in each square cell of the correlation array (i.e., one 1 and three 0’s), and
four cells, hence 44 = 256 vertices. The 16 probability variables in the correlation
array are constrained by the four probability constraints. It follows that the 256-vertex
polytope is 12-dimensional. A general correlation array is represented by a point in this
6A regular polytope is the multi-dimensional analogue of a regular polygon, e.g., an equilateral triangle,
or a square, or a pentagon in two dimensions. A convex set is, roughly, a set such that from any point in the
interior it is possible to ‘see’ any point on the boundary.
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polytope, so the probabilities in the array can be expressed (in general, non-uniquely)
as convex combinations of the 0, 1 probabilities in extremal correlation arrays (just as
the probability of one of two alternatives, 0 or 1, can be represented as a point on a line
between the end points 0 and 1 because it can be expressed as a convex combination of
the extremal end points).
There are 16 deterministic correlation arrays that satisfy the no-signaling princi-
ple, and the joint probabilities can all be expressed as products of marginal or local
probabilities for Alice and Bob separately. For example, the deterministic correlation
array in which the tastes are both ordinary (0) for all possible peeling combinations,
as in Table 2, is a no-signaling array and the joint probabilities can be expressed as a
product of local probabilities: a marginal Alice-probability of 1 for the taste 0 given
any peeling, and a marginal Bob-probability of 1 for the taste 0 given any peeling.
Alice Y B
Bob
Y p(00|Y Y ) = 1 p(10|Y Y ) = 0 p(00|BY ) = 1 p(10|BY ) = 0
p(01|Y Y ) = 0 p(11|Y Y ) = 0 p(01|BY ) = 0 p(11|BY ) = 0
B p(00|Y B) = 1 p(10|Y B) = 0 p(00|BB) = 1 p(10|BB) = 0
p(01|Y B) = 0 p(11|Y B) = 0 p(01|BB) = 0 p(11|BB) = 0
Table 2: Extremal no-signaling deterministic correlation array
The remaining 240 correlation arrays violate the no-signaling principle, and the
joint probabilities cannot be expressed as products of marginal or local probabilities
for Alice and Bob separately. For example, in Table 3, the taste of Alice’s banana
corresponds to Bob’s choice of peeling: if Bob peels Y, Alice’s banana tastes ordinary
(0), and if Bob peels B, Alice’s banana tastes intense (1). Similarly, the taste of Bob’s
banana corresponds to Alice’s choice of peeling. So a choice of peeling by Alice or
Bob is instantaneously revealed in the taste of a remote banana.
Alice Y B
Bob
Y p(00|Y Y ) = 1 p(10|Y Y ) = 0 p(00|BY ) = 0 p(10|BY ) = 0
p(01|Y Y ) = 0 p(11|Y Y ) = 0 p(01|BY ) = 1 p(11|BY ) = 0
B p(00|Y B) = 0 p(10|Y B) = 1 p(00|BB) = 0 p(10|BB) = 0
p(01|Y B) = 0 p(11|Y B) = 0 p(01|BB) = 0 p(11|BB) = 1
Table 3: Extremal signaling deterministic correlation array
The 16 vertices defined by the local no-signaling deterministic correlation arrays
are the vertices of a polytope: the polytope of local correlations. The local corre-
lation polytope is included in a no-signaling nonlocal polytope, defined by the 16
vertices of the local polytope together with an additional 8 nonlocal vertices, one of
these nonlocal vertices representing the standard (E)PR banana pair correlation array
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as defined above, and the other seven vertices representing (E)PR banana pairs (also
found in Bananaworld) related to the standard (E)PR pair by relabeling Alice’s peel-
ings (Y → B,B → Y ), and the tastes of Alice’s banana (0→ 1, 1→ 0) conditionally
on Alice’s choice of peeling, or Bob’s peelings, and the tastes of Bob’s banana condi-
tionally on Bob’s choice of peeling. For example, the correlations in Table 4 define an
(E)PR pair. Note that the 16 vertices of the local polytope can all be obtained from the
vertex represented by Table 2 by similar local reversible operations. Both the 16-vertex
local polytope and the 24-vertex no-signaling nonlocal polytope are 8-dimensional: in
addition to the four probability constraints (one for each cell in the correlation array),
there are four no-signaling constraints.
Alice Y B
Bob
Y p(00|Y Y ) = 0 p(10|Y Y ) = 12 p(00|BY ) = 0 p(10|BY ) = 12
p(01|Y Y ) = 12 p(11|Y Y ) = 0 p(01|BY ) = 12 p(11|BY ) = 0
B p(00|Y B) = 0 p(10|Y B) = 12 p(00|BB) = 12 p(10|BB) = 0
p(01|Y B) = 12 p(11|Y B) = 0 p(01|BB) = 0 p(11|BB) = 12
Table 4: (E)PR correlation array related to the standard (E)PR correlation array in
Table 1 by relabeling
Correlations represented by points in the local polytope can be simulated by Al-
ice and Bob with classical resources, which generate classical correlations represented
by the points in a simplex, where the vertices represent extremal states that are the
common causes of the correlations: joint ‘local hidden variable’ deterministic states
expressing shared randomness. A simplex is a regular convex polytope generated by
n+ 1 vertices that are not confined to any (n− 1)-dimensional subspace, e.g., a tetra-
hedron as opposed to a square. The lattice of subspaces of a simplex (the lattice of
vertices, edges, and faces) is a Boolean algebra, with a 1-1 correspondence between
the vertices, corresponding to the atoms of the Boolean algebra, and the facets (the
(n−1)-dimensional faces), which correspond to the co-atoms. The classical simplex—
in this case a 16-vertex simplex—represents the correlation polytope of probabilistic
states of two Bananaworld bananas that behave ‘classically,’ i.e., like a bipartite clas-
sical system with two binary-valued observables for each subsystem; the associated
Boolean algebra represents the classical possibility structure. Probability distributions
over these extremal states—mixed states—are represented by points in the interior or
on the boundary of the simplex.
The 24-vertex no-signaling nonlocal polytope is included in the 256-vertex nonlo-
cal polytope with 240 vertices that represent deterministic signaling states. The cor-
relations of a bipartite quantum system with two binary-valued observables for each
subsystem are bounded by the Tsirelson bound and are represented by a hyperspheri-
cal convex set that is not a polytope, with a continuous set of extremal points (quantum
pure states) between the 16-vertex local polytope and the 24-vertex no-signaling nonlo-
cal polytope. See Figure 3. Note that the vertices L of the local correlation polytope are
included in the quantum convex set—a correlation represented by L can be simulated
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S S
Figure 3: Schematic representation of part of the space of all possible correlation ar-
rays for two bananas with two possible peelings, Y or B, and two possible tastes,
ordinary (0) or intense (1). The vertices L are the deterministic vertices of the local
no-signaling polytope. Correlations represented by points in this polytope can be sim-
ulated with classical resources. The vertices S are the nonlocal signaling vertices (240
vertices). The Bananaworld polytope is bounded by the sixteen vertices L of the local
no-signaling polytope together with eight (E)PR vertices, which represent the strongest
possible nonlocal correlations consistent with the no-signaling principle. The hyper-
spherical quantum convex set is bounded by a continuous set of vertices and is not a
polytope. It lies between the 16-vertex local polytope and the 24-vertex Bananaworld
no-signaling polytope.
(trivially) by Alice and Bob with shared quantum states.
A simplex has the rather special property that a mixed state, represented by a point
in the interior of the simplex, can be expressed uniquely as a mixture (convex combi-
nation) of extremal or pure states, the vertices of the simplex. No other polytope or
convex set has this feature. So in the class of no-signaling theories, classical (= sim-
plex) theories are rather special. If there is no unique decomposition of mixed states
into deterministic pure states for the operational or phenomenal probabilities, as is the
case for the local 16-vertex polytope, then either there is something left out of the story
(which could, in principle, be added to complete the story as a simplex theory in which
the vertices represent the common causes of correlations), or the correlations are out-
side the local polytope and there is no theoretical account that provides an explanation
of correlations in terms of deterministic pure states without violating the no-signaling
principle: any no-signaling explanation of correlations will have to include indetermin-
istic states like (E)PR states.
Fundamentally, the conceptual problems in Bananaworld, as in our quantum world,
arise because probabilistic correlations can lie outside the local correlation polytope.
The existence of correlations outside the local correlation polytope means that we have
to give up the view that a banana in Bananaworld has what Einstein called a ‘being-
thus’ (‘So-Sein’ in German) [12, p. 170], in the sense that a banana is characterized by
definite properties, prior to any peeling, that are correlated, either deterministically or
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probabilistically, with a particular taste for a particular peeling.
If one asks what, irrespective of quantum mechanics, is characteristic of
the world of ideas of physics, one is first of all struck by the following:
the concepts of physics relate to a real outside world, that is, ideas are es-
tablished relating to things such as bodies, fields, etc., which claim a ‘real
existence’ that is independent of the perceiving subject—ideas which, on
the other hand, have been brought into as secure a relationship as possible
with sense-data. It is further characteristic of these physical objects that
they are thought of as arranged in a physical space-time continuum. An
essential aspect of this arrangement of things in physics is that they lay
claim, at a certain time, to an existence independent of one another, pro-
vided that these objects ‘are situated in different parts of space.’ Unless
one makes this kind of assumption about the independence of the exis-
tence (the ‘being-thus’) of objects which are far apart from one another in
space—which stems in the first place from everyday thinking—physical
thinking in the familiar sense would not be possible. It is also hard to see
any way of formulating and testing the laws of physics unless one makes
a clear distinction of this kind.7
To be sure, ‘physical thinking in the familiar sense’ will have to change, but for-
mulating and testing the laws of Bananaworld does not present any special problem.
The bananas in Bananaworld can be peeled and tasted. The phenomena are objective.
We don’t know how the universe makes bananas with Bananaworld correlations, but
we don’t know how the universe makes objects with independent ‘being-thuses’ either.
What we know is how elementary objects with elementary ‘being-thuses’ can be com-
posed or transformed dynamically into complex objects with complex ‘being-thuses,’
and in this sense we understand how correlations arise among such objects. The situa-
tion in Bananaworld (or our quantum world) is no different: given elementary entities
such as pure state bananas or (E)PR pairs, we can understand the behavior of complex
systems.
3 The Measurement Problem
What of the measurement problem in Bananaworld? The appropriate answer to the
question about how a banana selects a particular taste for a particular peeling—how ‘the
transition from the possible to the actual’ comes about—is that this occurs freely, as a
truly random event, consistent with the probabilistic correlations of the Bananaworld
correlation polytope. There is nothing more that needs to be said or can be said about
how the trick is done. In a simplex theory, it is possible to give a dynamical account of
the transition from one actually occurring event to another event, or to explain how a
particular measurement outcome is selected as a dynamical transition from one vertex
of the simplex to another. In a non-simplex theory, there is no analogous dynamical
account, because any such account would be inconsistent with ‘free choice’ or the no-
signaling principle—it would have to involve signaling states.
7The English translation is due to Max Born, and the reference here is to the translation in [6].
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There is, however, a remaining measurement problem in Bananaworld. Here is how
Bohm puts the problem for quantum mechanics [4, p. 583]:
If the quantum theory is to be able to provide a complete description of ev-
erything that can happen in the world . . . it should also be able to describe
the process of observation itself in terms of the wave functions of the ob-
serving apparatus and those of the system under observation. Furthermore,
in principle, it ought to be able to describe the human investigator as he
looks at the observing apparatus and learns what the results of the experi-
ment are, this time in terms of the wave functions of the various atoms that
make up the investigator, as well as those of the observing apparatus and
the system under observation. In other words, the quantum theory could
not be regarded as a complete logical system unless it contained within it a
prescription in principle for how all these problems were to be dealt with.
The bananas in Bananaworld are wildly nonclassical (and nonquantum) objects,
but the presumption is that visitors to the island are classical beings who can make
definite choices about how to peel bananas, and who have definite taste sensations
when they eat a peeled banana. The banana trees are located in definite locations on
the island, and have definite bunches of bananas of certain sorts, and so on. If we
want a unified physics, we can’t simply assume that all these systems have definite
‘being-thuses,’ while only the bananas exhibit correlations outside the local correla-
tion polytope. What if, in effect, ‘everything is made of bananas,’ i.e., if everything is
made of systems with correlations that can lie outside the local correlation polytope,
so that no system, including visiting observers to Bananaworld, can be understood as
having a definite ‘being-thus’ in Einstein’s sense? Unless there is a response to Bohm’s
question, any theory of Bananaworld phenomena can only be an instrumentalist theory,
where observers and their measuring instruments and recording devices are left out of
the theoretical story. What’s wrong with the Copenhagen interpretation is precisely the
assumption that observers are like visitors to Bananaworld, and that quantum phenom-
ena, like banana phenomena, take place in a classical arena that provides the physical
infrastructure for definite stable records. Bohr’s defense of this position [5, p. 209]:
The argument is simply that by the word experiment we refer to a situation
where we can tell others what we have done and what we have learned
and that, therefore, the account of the experimental arrangements and the
results of the observations must be expressed in unambiguous language
with suitable application of the terminology of classical physics,
is hardly more than an excuse for leaving observers and the recording infrastructure
out of the quantum theoretical story.
Can we show that a dynamics for Bananaworld is consistent with the assumption
that observers and their instruments (fingers, tastebuds, etc.) always have definite prop-
erties, so that we are entitled to infer from our theoretical account that something def-
inite or determinate happens when a banana is peeled and tasted, or in general when
we make a measurement? In the case of Bananaworld, this is doubtful, because of
constraints on a reasonable dynamics (see, e.g., [1]).
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For quantum mechanics, what we have to show is that the dynamics, which gen-
erally produces entanglement between two coupled systems, is consistent with the as-
sumption that something definite happens in a measurement process. The basic ques-
tion is whether it is consistent with the unitary dynamics to take the macroscopic mea-
surement ‘pointer’ or, in general, the macroworld as definite. The answer is ‘no,’ if we
accept an interpretative principle sometimes referred to as the ‘eigenvalue-eigenstate
link.’
Dirac’s states the principle as follows [11, pp. 46–47]8:
The expression that an observable ‘has a particular value’ for a particu-
lar state is permissible in quantum mechanics in the special case when a
measurement of the observable is certain to lead to the particular value, so
that the state is an eigenstate of the observable. . . . In the general case we
cannot speak of an observable having a value for a particular state, but we
can speak of its having an average value for the state. We can go further
and speak of the probability of its having any specified value for the state,
meaning the probability of this specified value being obtained when one
makes a measurement of the observable.
Dirac’s principle, together with the linearity of the unitary dynamics of quantum
mechanics, leads to the measurement problem: the definiteness of a particular measure-
ment outcome is inconsistent with the entangled state that linearity requires at the end
of a measurement. Typically, the measuring instrument is a macroscopic system, like
Schro¨dinger’s cat, where the cat states |alive〉 and |dead〉 are correlated with eigenstates
of a microsystem in the final entangled state at the end of the dynamical interaction.
Here the macroscopic cat states act as measurement pointer states for the eigenvalues
of the measured observable of the microsystem.
The eigenvalue-eigenstate link is an interpretative principle, a stipulation about
when an observable ‘has a particular value,’ that is not required by the kinematic struc-
ture of quantum mechanics. Alternative stipulations are possible. In particular, no
contradiction is involved in stipulating that some particular ‘preferred’ observable, R,
is always definite (as long as we don’t stipulate other noncommuting observables as
also definite).
The following theorem [8] characterizes all possible stipulations, subject to some
minimal constraints. If R is a preferred observable in this sense (stipulated as always
definite, i.e., as always having a determinate value), and e is the ray representing a pure
quantum state, there is a unique maximal sublattice L(R, e) in the lattice of Hilbert
space subspaces representing quantum propositions, such that:
• L(R, e) contains the eigenspaces of the preferred observable R
• L(R, e) is defined byR and e alone (i.e., L(R, e) is invariant under Hilbert space
lattice automorphisms that preserve R and e)
8 One finds similar remarks in von Neumann [25, p. 253] and in the EPR paper [13]. The EPR argument
is formulated as a reductio for the principle: EPR show that it follows from the principle, together with
certain realist assumptions, that quantum mechanics is incomplete
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• L(R, e) is an ortholattice admitting sufficiently many 2-valued homomorphisms
(truth-value assignments)9 to recover all the single and joint probabilities defined
by the state e for mutually compatible sets of elements in L(R, e) as measures
on a Kolmogorov probability space, so that the probability of an element a in
L(R, e) is just the measure of the set of 2-valued homomorphisms that assign 1
to a
See [14] for a C∗-algebraic generalization of the theorem, and [17] for a topos-
theoretic generalization. The elements in L(R, e) are obtained by projecting e onto the
eigenspaces of R. These projections, together with all the rays in the subspace orthog-
onal to the span of the projections, generate L(R, e). In the case of Schro¨dinger’s cat,
if we take R as the cat-observable with eigenstates |alive〉 and |dead〉, then it follows
that the cat is definitely alive or definitely dead in the entangled state after the interac-
tion with the microsystem, and the microsystem property correlated with the cat being
definitely alive or the cat being definitely dead is also definite in the final entangled
state.
Here is one way to solve the consistency problem: If we take R as the decoherence
‘pointer’ selected by environmental decoherence, then it follows that the macroworld
is always definite because of the nature of the decoherence interaction coupling envi-
ronmental degrees of freedom to macroworld degrees of freedom (a contingent feature
of the quantum dynamics), and it follows from the theorem that features of the mi-
croworld correlated with R are definite. In other words, decoherence guarantees the
continued definiteness or persistent objectivity of the macroworld, if we stipulate that
R is the decoherence ‘pointer.’
The eigenvalue-eigenstate link, or Dirac’s principle, amounts to the stipulation that
the preferred observable R is the identity I , which has the whole Hilbert space and the
null space as the two eigenspaces. There is a sense in which the eigenstate-eigenvalue
link is preserved by the alternative stipulation of R as the decoherence pointer. If a
system S is not entangled with the decoherence pointer R, so that the total state is a
product state |s〉 ⊗ · · · , where |s〉 is the state of S, then the decoherence pointer takes
the form I ⊗ R, where I is the identity in the Hilbert space of S, and the definite S-
properties according to the above theorem are as specified by the eigenstate-eigenvalue
link.
The argument here is not that decoherence provides a dynamical explanation of
how an indefinite quantity becomes definite in a measurement process—Bell [3] has
aptly criticized this argument as a ‘for all practical purposes’ (FAPP) solution to the
measurement problem. Rather, the claim is that we can take the decoherence pointer
as definite by stipulation, and that decoherence then guarantees the objectivity of the
macroworld, which resolves the measurement problem without resorting to Copen-
hagen or neo-Copenhagen instrumentalism.
To sum up: What we have discovered is that there are probabilistic correlations
outside the polytope of local correlations—the structure of information is not what we
thought it was. The ‘no go’ theorems tell us that we can’t shoe-horn these correlations
into a classical simplex by supposing that something has been left out of the story, with-
out giving up fundamental principles that define what we mean by a physical system.
9But not sufficiently many to distinguish every pair of distinct elements, as there is in a Boolean algebra.
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The nonclassical features of quantum mechanics, including the irreducible information
loss on measurement, are generic features of non-simplex theories.
As far as the conceptual problems are concerned, we might as well talk about Ba-
nanaworld, bearing in mind that what counts as a good explanation in a non-simplex
theory should not be constrained by the standard ontology that goes along with explana-
tion in a simplex theory. In particular, we should not expect to find a dynamical expla-
nation for the selection of a particular outcome in a quantum measurement, which is a
genuinely random event, a ‘free choice’ on the part of a quantum system. The comple-
mentary information loss or ‘irreducible and uncontrollable measurement disturbance’
is a kinematic feature of any process of gaining information of the relevant sort, ir-
respective of the particular unitary dynamical process involved in the measurement
process—just as the phenomenon of Lorentz contraction is explained relativistically as
a kinematic effect of motion in a non-Newtonian space-time structure, irrespective of
the particular Lorentz covariant dynamical process associated with the specific material
constitution of the contracting system.
The kinematic part of quantum mechanics as a non-simplex theory is given by
the subspace structure of Hilbert space, which represents the structure of the space of
possibilities for quantum events. This includes the association of Hermitian operators
with observables, the Born probabilities, the von Neumann-Lu¨ders conditionalization
rule, and the unitarity constraint on the dynamics, which is related to the possibility
structure via a theorem of Wigner [26, 24]. The possibility space is a non-Boolean
space in which there are built-in, structural probabilistic constraints on correlations
between events (associated with the angles between the rays representing extremal
events)—just as in special relativity the geometry of Minkowski space-time represents
spatio-temporal constraints on events. These are kinematic, i.e., pre-dynamic, objec-
tive probabilistic or information-theoretic constraints on events to which a quantum
dynamics of matter and fields conforms, through its symmetries, just as the structure
of Minkowski space-time imposes spatio-temporal kinematic constraints on events to
which a relativistic dynamics conforms.
The problem of how to account for the definiteness or determinateness of the part of
the universe that records the outcomes of quantum measurements or random quantum
events is a consistency problem. The question is whether it is consistent with the quan-
tum dynamics to take some part of the universe, including the registration of quantum
events by our macroscopic measuring instruments, as having a definite ‘being-thus,’
characterized by definite properties. This is not so much a conceptual problem as a
problem for physics. The phenomenon of decoherence, a contingent feature of the
system-environment interaction in our quantum universe, provides a solution.
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